on extensive field failure data for Tandem's GUARDIAN operating system, this paper discusses evaluation of the dependability of operational software. Software faults considered are major defects that result in processor failures and invoke backup processes to take over. The paper categorizes the underlying causes of software failures and evaluates the effectiveness of the process pair technique in tolerating software faults. A model to describe the impact of software faults on the reliability of an overall system is proposed. The model is used to evaluate the significance of key factors that determine software dependability and to identify areas for imProvement.
I. INTRODUCTION
HIS paper discusses evaluation of the dependability of operational software based on measurements taken from the Tandem GUARDIAN operating system. The Tandem  GUARDIAN system is a commercial fault-tolerant system built for on-line transaction processing and decision support. The GUARDIAN operating system is a message-based operating system that runs on a Tandem machine. Many studies have sought to improve the software development environment by _; .' LZ; / [1] , [2] , [31. The dependability issues for operational software are typically very different from those for software under development, due to differences in the operational environment and software maturity. Also, the dependability of operational software needs to be investigated in the context of the overall system.
A study of the dependability of operational software based on real measurements requires, in addition to instrumentation and data collection, an understanding of the system architecture, hardware, and software. It also requires an understanding of the development, service, and operational environments.
Typically, measurement-based studies attempt to answer several questions: What are the key failure modes and their significance, how well do specific fault-tolerance techniques work, and what is a realistic behavior model for the software and its associated parameters? This paper presents results based on field failure data collected from the Tandem pact of software faults on the overall system. The next section discusses related research. Section III introduces the Tandem GUARDIAN system and the measurements made. Section IV investigates the underlying causes (faults) that resulted in the observed software failures and categorizes the identified faults. The significance of failure recurrence is also discussed. Section V evaluates the software fault tolerance of process pairs. The reasons for achieving this software fault tolerance are investigated.
This evaluation is important because, although process pairs are specific to Tandem systems, they are an implementation of the general approach of checkpointing and restart. Section VI builds a model that describes the impact of faults in the GUARDIAN operating system on the reliability of an overall Tandem system. A sensitivity analysis is conducted to evaluate the significance of the factors that determine software dependability and to identify areas for improvement. Section VII summarizes the major conclusions of this study.
II. RELATED RESEARCH
Software errors in the development phase have been extensively studied. Software error data collected from the DOS/VS operating system during the testing phase were analyzed in [4] .
A wide-ranging analysis of software error data collected during the development phase was reported in [5] . An error analysis technique was used to evaluate software development methodologies in [6] . Relationships between the frequency and distribution of errors.during software development, maintenance of the developed software, and a variety of environmental factors were analyzed in [7] . The orthogonal defect classification, the use of observed software defects to provide feedback on the development process, was proposed in [8] .
These studies mainly attempt to fine-tune the software development environment based on error analysis. Software reliability modeling has also been studied extensively, and many models have been proposed [1] , [2] , [3] . For the most part, these models attempt to estimate the reliability of software by analyzing the failure history of software during the development phase, verification efforts, and operational profile.
Measurement-based analysis of operational software dependability has also evolved over the past 15 years. An early study proposed a workload-dependent probabilistic model for predicting software errors based on measurements from a DEC system [9] . The effect of workload on operating system reliability was analyzed using the data collected from an IBM 3081 machine running VM/SP [10] . A Marker model to describe the software error and recovery process in a production environment using error logs from the MVS operating system was discussed in [1 I] . Software defects and their impact on system availability were investigated using data from the IBM MVS system in [12] . In [13] , results from a census of Tandem systems were presented. The data showed that soRware was the major source (62%) of outages in the Tandem system. Dependability and fault tolerance of three operating systems---the Tandem GUARDIAN system, the IBM MVS system, and the VAX VMS system--were analyzed using error logs in [14] .
Software failures have also been studied from the software fault-tolerance perspective. Two major approaches for software fault tolerance---recovery blocks and N-version programmingmwere proposed in [15], [16] . Dependability modeling and evaluation of these two approaches were discussed in [17] . The effectiveness of recovery routines in the MVS operating system was evaluated using measurements from an IBM 3081 machine in [18] . Software fault tolerance in the Tandem GUARDIAN operating system was discussed in [19], [20] . Architectural issues for incorporating hardware and software fault tolerance were discussed in [21], [22], [23].
III. TANDEM SYSTEM AND MEASUREMENTS
The Tandem GUARDIAN system is a message-based multiprocessor system built for on-line transaction processing and decision support [20] . A Tandem GUARDIAN system consists of two to 16 processors, dual interprocessor buses, dual-port device controllers, input/output (I/(3) devices, multiple I/O buses, and redundant power supplies (Fig. 1) . The key software components are processes and messages. With a separate copy of the GUARDIAN operating system running on each processor, these abstractions hide the physical boundaries between processors and systems and provide a uniform environment across a network of Tandem systems.
In the Tandem GUARDIAN system, a critical system function or user application is replicated on two processors as primary and backup processes, i.e., as a process pair. Normally, only the primary process provides service. The primary sends checkpoints to the backup, so that the backup can take over the function when the primary fails. The GUARDIAN system software halts the processor it runs on when it detects nonrecoverable errors. Nonrecoverable errors are a subset of exceptions in privileged system processes. They are detected by the operating system or explicit software checks made by privileged system processes. The designer determines whether a specific exception is nonrecoverable. The "I'm alive" message protocol allows the other processors to detect the halt and to take over the primaries that were .running on the halted processor. With multiple processors running process pairs, dual interprocessor buses, dual-port device controllers, multiple I/O buses, disk mirroring, and redundant power supplies, the system can tolerate a single failure in a processor, bus, device controller, disk, or power supply.
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Procecsing Unit 2 to 16 Proee_ors In this paper, a software fault is a defect in the measured software system, and a software failure is a processor failure due to software. The terms processor halt and processor failure are used interchangeably. Fig. 2 illustrates the software failure and recovery process in the Tandem GUARDIAN system. When a fault in the system software is exercised, an error (a fast error) is generated. Depending on the processor state, this error may disappear or cause additional errors before being detected. The impact of a detected error ranges from a minor cosmetic problem at the user/system interface to a database corruption. A software failure occurs when the system software detects nonrecoverable errors and asserts a processor halt.
Once a software failure occurs, the system attempts to recover using backup processes on other processors. If this recover), is successful, the system can tolerate the software fault. The time it takes for the system to detect a processor halt and for the backup to attain the primary's pre failure state depend., on several factors, such as the priority of the process, processor configuration, and workload. (SoRware "Cause Identified," Software "Cause Unidentified," and "Non-Software Problem"). Determining whether a failure was caused by software faults is not straightforward, due partly to system complexity and partly to close interactions between the soRware and the hardware in the system. The only reliable approach is to declare an incident to be a software problem only after analysts have located a fault in the software, repro-duced the incident, and designed and tested a soRw.are fix. Software causes were identified "for 153 TPRs ("Cause Identified"). If a TPR identified a fault in the soft'ware and resulted in a software fix, the incident was counted as a software problem, even if it was initially triggered by a nonsoftware cause (e.g., a hardware fault). In 26 TPRs ("Cause Unidentified"), analysts believed that the underlying problems were software faults, but they had not yet located the faults.
We use the term unidentified failures to refer to these cases.
The rest of the TPRs ("Non-SoRware Problem") were due mainly to hardware faults (e.g., a failure in power supply) or operational faults (e.g., incorrectly specifying hardware specifications in a system table). Note that 76.5% of the TPRs that were initially classified as sottware problems were confn'med as soRware problems, 13% of them were probably set, ware problems, and the rest (10.5%) were non-software problems.
The 179 TPRs ("Cause Identified" and "Cause Unidentified")
formed the basis of our analysis. Fig. 3 specifies which groups of the TPRs were used to build the subsequent tables. Most of the categories in Table I are self-explanatory.
"Incorrect computation" refers to anarithmetic overflow or the use of an incorrect arithmetic function (e.g., use of a signed arithmetic function instead of an unsigned one). "Data fault" refers to the use of an incorrect constant or variable. "Data definition fault" refers to a fault in declaring data or in defining a data structure. "Missing operation" refers to an omission of lines of source code. "Side effect of code update" occurs when not all dependencies between software modules were considered when updating the software. "Unexpected situation" refers to cases in which software designers did not anticipate a legitimate operational scenario, and the software did not handle the situation correctly.
In the 24 TPRs we were "Unable to classify due to insufficient information," analysts did not provide detailed information about the nature of the underlying faults. "Missing operation" and "Unexpected situation" were the most common types of software faults in the 
B. Outages Due to Software
This evaluation first focused on the multiple processor halts.
For each multiple processor halt, we investigated the first two processor halts to determine whether the second halt occurred on the processor executing the backup of the failed primary process. In these cases, we also investigated whether the two processors halted because of the same software fault.
TABLE Ill
REASONS FOR MULTIPLE PROCESSOR HALTS
Reasons for Multiple Processor Halts
The second halt occurs on the processor executing the backup of the failed primary.
The second halt occurs due to the same fault that halted the primary.
The second halt occurs due to another fault during job takeover.
Unableto classify. The second haltis not related to processpairs.
Thesystem hangs. Faulty parallelsoRwareexecutes.
There is a random coincidence of two independent faults.
A single processor halt occurs,but system coldload is necessaryforrecovery. Unableto classify. All 
O) system is not designed to tolerate. Table III shows that in 86% of the multiple processor halts (24 out of 28, excluding "Unable to classify" cases), the backup of the failed primary process was unable to continue the execution. In 81% of these halts (17 out of 2 I, excluding "Unable to classify" cases), the backup failed because of the same fault that caused the failure of the primary. In the remaining 19% of the halts, the processor executing the backup of the failed primary halted because of another fault during job takeover. About half Of the multiple processor halts resulted in system coldloads. (A system coldload is a situation in which all processors in a system are reloaded.) The data showed that, in most situations, the system lost a set of disks that contained flies required by other processors as a result of the first two processor halts, and other processors also halted. This sequence is the major failure mode of the system resulting from software faults.
C. Characterization of Software Fault Tolerance
The information in Table II raises the question of why the
Tandem system lost only one processor in 82% of soft-ware failures and, as a result, tolerated the soRware faults that caused these failures. We identified the reasons for software fault tolerance (SFT) in all single processor halts (138 instances; refer to Table II ) and classified them into several groups. Table IV shows that in 29% of single processor halts (40 out of 138), the fault that caused a failure of a primary process was not exercised again when the backup reexecuted the same task after a takeover. These situations occurred because some software faults are exposed in a specific memory state (e.g., running out of buffer), on the occurrence of a single event or a sequence of asynchronous events during a vulnerable time window (timing), by race conditions or concurrent operations among multiple processes, or on the occurrence of a hardware error. 
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The backup, aRer takeover, does not automatically reexecote the failed task.
It is the effect of error latency.
A fault stops a processor runninl[ a backup.
The cause of a problem is unidentified.
Unable to classify. Clearly, such a situation was not tested during the development phase. Since a memory dump is usually taken only from a halted processor in a production system, a memory dump of the processor running the backup was not available. Our best guess is that the backup process served the request again after takeover but did not have a problem, because a buffer was available on the processor running the backup. Table IV also shows that, in 20% of single processor halts (28 out of 138), the backup of a failed primary process did not have to serve the failed request after a successful takeover.
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This happened because some faults are exposed while serving requests that are important but are not automatically resubmitted to the backup upon a failure of the primary. When the operator ran PK with a certain option that is not frequently used, PK used an incorrect constant to initialize its data structure. As a result, it overwrote (cleared) the page addresses of the first segment in the segment page gains access to the system. Utilities to perform these reeonfigurations run as process pairs, but the operator command to add, activate, or abort an I/O unit is not automatically resubmitted to the backup, because it is an interactive task that can easily be resubmitted by the operator if the primary fails. Suppose that an operator's request to add an I/O unit caused a failure of the primary. In this situation, the operator would typically recover the halted processor, rather than submit the same request to the backup. If the operator wants to repeat the same request, he or she would normally repeat it on the primary after the halted processor is reloaded. If the operator submits the request to the backup instantly upon a failure of the primary, one of two situations can be expected: the backup also fails, or the backup serves the request without any problem due to the factors in Table IV. In the above examples, the task (i.e., process PK or a command to add an I/O unit) does not survive the failure. But process pairs allow the other applications on the halted processor to continue to run. This situation is not strictly SFT but a side benefit of using process pairs. If these failures are excluded, the estimated measure of SFT is adjusted to 78% (110 out of 141). Another reason for the SFT is that some software faults cause errors that are detected after the task that caused the errors finishes successfully (effect of error latency). Fig. 6 shows The difference between this case and the first group of cases listed in Table IV is that the task that caused the failure of the primary did not have to be executed again in the backup. failure caused a single processor halt is unknown. Based on their symptoms, we speculate that a significant number of unidentified failures were single processor halts because of the effect of error latency.
D. Discussion
The results in this section have several implications.
First, the results show that hardware fault tolerance buys SFT. The use of process pairs in Tandem systems, which was originally intended for tolerating hardware faults, allows the system to tolerate about 75% of reported field faults in the system sot_ware that cause processor failures. Subtle faults exist in all software, but SFT is not achieved if the backup execution is a replication of the original execution. The loose coupling between processors, which results in the backup execution (the processor state and the sequence of events occurring) being different from the original execution, is a major reason for the measured SFT. Each processor in a Tandem system has an independent processing environment; therefore, the system naturally provides such differences.
(The advantages of using checkpointing, as compared with lock-step operation, in tel-crating software faults were discussed in [19] .) The level of SFT achieved by the use of process pairs will depend on the proportion of subtle faults in software. While process pairs may not provide perfect SFT, the implementation of process pairs is not as prohibitively expensive as is developing and maintaining multiple versions of large software programs. Second, the results indicate that process pairs can sometimes allow the system to avoid multiple processor halts due to software faults, regardless of the nature of the faults, because sottware failures can occur while the system executes important tasks that are not automatically resubmitted to the backup on a failure of the primary. In such a case, the failed task does not survive, but the other applications on the failed processor do. Finally, an interesting question is: If process pairs are good, are process triples better? Our results show that process triples may not necessarily be better, because the faults that cause double processor halts with process pairs may cause triple processor halts with process triples. Table V compares the severity of the three types of software failures using the 174 software failures discussed in this section. There were two special cases ("Others") in the table: a multiple processor halt due to a parallel execution of faulty code (a system coldload was not required) and a software failure during a system reboot. With only a single observation in each case, the significance of these situations was unclear, and they were not considered in the subsequent analysis. "Severity Unclear" cases were also not considered further. as a random trial with the probability of a double processor halt being 0.23 (nine out of 39,'following the statistics for the first occurrence). The hypothesis that the probability of a recurrence causing a double processor halt is equal to that of a first occurrence causing a double processor halt was tested by calculating the probability of having 19 or fewer double processor halts out of I03 trials. The p-value was 0.16; that is, the hypothesis was rejected at the 20% significance level.
E. First Occurrences vs. Recurrences
Two of the six system coldloads due to first occurrences were single processor halt situations. These two failures capture the secondary failure mode of the system due to sottware, 
A. Model Construction
We considered a hypothetical eight-processor Tandem system whose software reliability characteristics are described by the parameters in Table VI . In this analysis, the term software reliability means the reliability of an overall system whtn only the faults in the system software that cause processor failures are considered.
A system failure was defined to occur when more than half the processors in the system failed. In Table VI , "Prob(double CPU haltlsot_are failure)" is the probability that a double processor halt (i.e., a failure of a process pair) occurs given that a software failure occurs.
Similarly, "Prob(system failure[double CPU halt)" is the probability that a system failure occurs given that a double processor halt occurs. These two parameters were used to describe the major failure mode of the system because of software. If a software failure occurs during the normal system operation (i.e., when the system is in the So state), the system enters the Rt state. If the failure is severe enough to cause a system coldload, a system failure occurs; otherwise, the system attempts to recover from the failure by using backups. If recovery is successful, the system enters the St state; otherwise, a double processor halt occurs. If the two halted processors
control key system resources (such as a set of disks) that are essential for system operation, the rest of the processors in the system also halt and a system failure occurs; otherwise, the system enters the Sz state and continues to operate. The value of r, the transition rate out of an Ri, is small and has virtually no impact on software reliability; a value of one transition per minute was used in the analysis. Since the system stays in an R_ state for a short time, additional failures occurring in an R_ state were ignored; in fact, these failures were implied in the failure rate (2) in the corresponding Sj and Se, t states. Given the model in Fig. 7 , soRware reliability of the system can be estimated by calculating the distribution of time for the system to be absorbed to the Sao_, state, starting from the So state.
In Fig. 7 , the three coverage parameters Cd, C,a, and C= were calculated from The parameter Ca includes the two cases explained in Section V: the failure of a process pair caused by a single soRware fault and the failure of a process pair caused by two software faults (the second halt occurs during job takeover). The parameter C,d represents the probability thatthe system loses key system resources as a result of a double processor halt. The parameter C•a is determined primarily by the system configuration and is discussed further in Section VI.D. The above three parameters can actually be obtained directly from Table   V in Section V.E. Equations (2), (3), and (4) will be used to investigate the impact of recurrences (2) on soRware reliability in Section VI.B.
The model (Fig. 7) includes the effect of multiple independent software failures. For example, if a software failure occurs when the system is in the S_ state (i _ 0), the following three system failure scenarios must be considered ( Fig. 8 ):
1) The system fails regardless of whether the new failure causes a single or double processor halt. This is because when the first processor halts because of the new failure, key system resources (such as a set of disks) become inaccessible.
2) The system fails because the new failure is severe and can only be recovered by a system coldload.
3) The new soRware failure causes a double processor halt, and the second processor halt causes a set of disks to become inaccessible. It was not possible to directly measure the branching probabilities in Fig. 8 for each state from the data, because the major failure mode (i.e., a software failure occurred when the system is in the So state, causing a double processor halt and subsequently causing a system failure) was dominant. These probabilities were estimated using the three measured parameters: Ca, C,a, and C_,. Table VII shows the branching probabilities in Fig. 8 estimated for each S, (i ¢ 0) state. For exam- processor halt when the system is in the S_ state, the probabilit), that the third processor halt does not cause a system failure (path D in Fig. 8) is (1  C,d) 2. This is because the probability that the third processor halted and either of the two processors that were already halted control key system resources (i.e.,
cause a system failure) is Csa. The branching probabilities in Table VII were used to determine the corresponding transition rates in the model (Fig. 7) .
The same recovery rate was used regardless of the number of processors halted. This was because the recovery time is Table VIII shows the six factors considered in the analysis. The second column of the table shows activities related to these factors, and the third column shows the model parame-ters affected by the factors. For example, a 10% reduction in the recurrence rate (g,), which can be achieved by improving the software service environment, will reduce 3. by 6.1% (Table VI) It is suggested that more measurements and analyses be conducted in the manner proposed here so that a wide range of information on the dependability of operational software is available. 
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